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BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE 
CHALK CREEK-HOYSTVILLE WATER USERS CORPORATION 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL1 
The Order and Final Judgment was entered September 16, 2008.2 The Notice of 
Appeal was timely filed on October 14,2008 ;3 an Amended Notice of Appeal (eliminating 
'The trial court record consists of papers from two cases that were ultimately 
consolidated, but the papers in each case were indexed separately for appeal. Papers from 
Haynes Land & Livestock Co. v. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, trial court case no. 980600244, 
will be cited as "R-Haynes." Papers from Triple HRanch, LC v. Boyer, trial court case no. 
000600299, will be cited as "R-TripleH." 
2R-Haynes 1693-1700. 
3R-Haynes 1701-1705. 
1 
Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users Corporation as an appellant) was filed October 16, 
2008.4 Boyers5 and Jacobs6 each filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal on October 17, 2008. 
The Order and Final Judgment contained a certification of finality under Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.7 A claim for partition by Triple H Ranch, LC against 
Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and Alfred C. Blonquist remains 
pending before the trial court. 
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code § 
78A-3-102(3)(j). This Court has pour-over jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Where the roads in question did not appear on maps of the period, there was 
no evidence of a definite path of travel, and no proof that travelers lacked express or implied 
permission, did evidence that some people arrived at that destination compel a finding, under 
the clear and convincing standard, that a definite road existed to that destination and had been 
used continuously without permission by members of the public for ten years? 
Standard of review: 
The standard of review in road dedication cases was recently summarized as follows: 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal interpretation of 
the Dedication Statute for correctness and its factual findings for 
4R-Haynes 1711-1715. 
5R-Haynes 1716-20. 
6R-Haynes 1721-25. 
7R-Haynes 1697. 
2 
clear error. But whether the facts of a case satisfy the 
requirements of the Dedication Statute is a mixed question of 
fact and law that involves various and complex facts, 
evidentiary resolutions, and credibility determinations. Thus, an 
appellate court reviews a trial court's decision regarding 
whether a public highway has been established under the 
Dedication Statute for correctness but grants the court 
significant discretion in its application of the facts to the statute.8 
In applying this standard, however, it must be remembered that (1) the Boyers and 
Jacobs on cross-appeal really seek not to overturn a finding, but to compel a finding on an 
issue where the trial court has "significant discretion in its application of the facts to the 
statute"9 and (2) the trial court could have made the requested finding only if the evidence 
were clear and convincing.10 These factors are addressed below. 
The general standard for compelling a finding is as follows: 
Inasmuch as under the issues as hereinabove recited, the burden 
of proving its defense was upon the defendant, we would not 
reverse and compel a finding in accordance with that contention 
unless the evidence were such that all reasonable minds would 
necessarily so find. Conversely, if there is a reasonable basis in 
the evidence, or from lack of evidence, upon which reasonable 
minds could remain unconvinced, we would not disturb the 
ruling of the trial court.11 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10,1f 8, 179 P.3d 768, 772. 
9Id. 
l0/</.at1J9, 179P.3dat773. 
nCenturian Corp, v. Fiberchem, Inc., 562 P.2d 1252, 1253 (Utah 1977). Accord 
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983). 
3 
Moreover, where the standard of proof was clear and convincing evidence, the 
presumption on appeal against compelling a finding should be even more deferential to the 
ruling of the trial court.12 
In challenging the decision of the trial court, the cross-appellants were required to 
marshal the evidence supporting that decision: 
When parties appeal a court's fact-sensitive use of its 
discretionary powers, they must successfully challenge the 
factual findings upon which the trial court's decision depended. 
This requires that parties marshal the evidence. As we have 
previously explained, parties who ask this court to consider 
fact-sensitive questions—including those questions reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard—have a duty to marshal all 
the evidence that formed the basis for the trial court's ruling.13 
Preservation below: The Water Users do not disagree with the statement of Jacobs 
and Boyers that this issue was raised below. 
2. Where the trial focused on a loop road and the parties presented evidence 
concerning all segments of the road, did the court err in determining the rights of all the 
parties in each segment of the road even though some parties had not specifically requested 
that relief? 
Standard of review: No Utah case specifically sets the standard for review of a 
decision under Rule 54(c). This Court should apply the same standard as determinations 
l2See Nikols v. Goodman & Chesnoff 2009 Ut App 79, ffif 7, 11, 206 P.3d 295; In re 
Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111, 1115 n. 1 (Utah 1982). 
^United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower ML Fonds, 2006 UT 35, \ 38, 
140 P.3d 1200, 1208-09 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
4 
under Rule 15(b), reviewing the trial court's application of the rule for correctness but 
according broad discretion in determining whether the issue was within the scope of matters 
decided in the case.14 
Preservation below: The Water Users do not disagree with the statement of Jacobs 
and Boyers that this issue was raised below. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (2006): "A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use 
of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often 
years." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1): 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment 
is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief 
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even 
if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may 
be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it 
may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among 
themselves. 
l4See Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102, 105 (Utah 
1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Chalk Creek-Hoystville Water Users Corporation ("Water Users") incorporates the 
Statement of the Case on Cross-Appeal from the Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of 
Cross-Appellee (Haynes Parties). Additional statements regarding the evidence are presented 
in connection with the argument below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court fixed the end points of the Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road 
at the points shown on the maps of the period. To challenge that finding, the defendants 
were required to marshal all the evidence and show that no was no evidence to support the 
finding, and were further required to show evidence that would compel a finding, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that public non-permissive use had created a road in a definite 
location. The maps themselves support the trial court's decision. In addition, there was 
substantial testimony that no road existed beyond the points found by the trial court. 
The determination that the Water Users have a prescriptive easement across the Boyer 
property, although not raised in the pleadings, was within the scope of the trial court's effort 
to determine all the rights in the subject road. Further, any error was harmless because the 
Water Users have express easements over the roads. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I: THERE WAS NO CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
COMPELLING A FINDING THAT THE MIDDLE FORK ROAD 
EXTENDED TO THE BOYER PROPERTY, 
There was evidence that some of the people who traveled the Middle Fork Road did 
so to reach the "Blue Lakes," which apparently include Boyer Lake, Joyce Lake, Blue Lake, 
and perhaps other lakes. The trial court found the Middle Fork Road extended only to a point 
a significant distance from Boyer Lake. Although maps of the period show no road going 
to any one of the lakes, Boyers now ask this Court to hold that the evidence was clear and 
convincing as a matter of law that the persons who traveled the road must have gone to Boyer 
Lake (rather than Blue Lake or Joyce Lake or some other destination) and that they must 
have followed the same path as the current road. In making this argument, Boyers fail to 
understand the unique requirements of an R.S. 247715 public road claim.16 
Most of the road Boyers address is in section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8 East. 
During the critical time frame of 1880 to 1896, this road was owned by the federal 
government. Any claim of a public road therefore must meet the requirements of R.S. 2477. 
15Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (1866), repealed by Federal 
Lands Policy Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743 (codified 
as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-71). 
16Although the Water Users chose to not appeal directly from the trial court's finding 
that the Middle Fork Road and other roads were public, they support and agree with the 
position of the Haynes parties, set forth in the Opening Brief of Appellants (Haynes Parties), 
that none of the roads at issue are public. 
7 
That section states: "The right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, 
not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." 
R.S. 2477 did not grant the public an easement to traverse land wherever convenient, 
but rather granted the right to "construct" a road. Actual mechanical construction may not 
be required,17 but there must still be some use that results in an actual, physical road. The 
"way must have a particular definite line; the grantee does not have the right to go at random 
over any and all parts of the servient estate."18 Thus, several courts have rejected road claims 
where there were several lines of travel, all converging to a common point.19 In Dahl v. 
Roach ,20 the Utah Supreme Court rejected a claim of public road in part because the evidence 
did not show that the public "were confined to any particular strip or portion" of the land.21 
11
 Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, 425 F.3d 735, 
779-81 (10th Cir. 2005). 
1825 Am Jur 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 64. 
19Gentleman v. Soule, 32 111. 271, 278 (1863) (several roads led to a ford on a river); 
Dooling v. Dabel, 186 P.2d 183, 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (users did not acquire a right of 
way by prescription, because they did not follow one definite path or course, but traveled 
over the land in various courses or directions); Gibson v. Buice, 394 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 
App. 1981) ("a prescriptive right-of-way cannot be acquired to pass over a tract of land 
generally but must be confined to a reasonably definite line and limited to the extent of the 
actual use. [T]o claim a prescriptive easement, one must allege and prove its route, termini 
and width."); Manchester v. Blaess, 258 Mich. 652, 654-56,242 N.W. 798, 799 (1932) (the 
village had not acquired a prescriptive right to drive or park on the owner's land because 
there was no specific driveway or definite line that had been used as the right of way). 
2076 Utah 74, 287 P. 622 (1930). 
11
 Id. at 78, 287 P. at 623. 
8 
Boyers argue that "the relocation of a road that does not substantially affect the 
general course of a highway does not alter its public status."22 Boyers cite to two Utah 
decisions in support of this claim, but neither is on point. In Memmott v. Anderson?* the 
issue was whether an adjoining landowner could object to the relocation of an existing public 
road. There is no discussion of whether relocation of the path of travel during the 
prescriptive period affects the initial creation of the road. In Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. 
v. Churnos,24 the evidence also showed an established road, although the location had been 
changed slightly: 
There was evidence that the travel over the road did not always 
follow an identical or uniform line, but at times and in a few 
places varied somewhat therefrom, and that sheep when trailing 
across would sometimes depart from the line of the road. There 
was ample positive evidence, however, that the road as 
described by the findings and decree was substantially the line 
and course of the road as it had been traveled and used for more 
than fifty years.25 
Here, in contrast, there simply was no clear and convincing evidence of an established 
road. Had Boyers marshaled the evidence, they would have been required to show that Gary 
Boyer testified that the area at the end of the established road is a gently sloping valley, and 
users could have taken any route they chose.26 Chuck Horman noted that the road didn't 
22Boyers'briefat23. 
23642P.2d 750 (Utah 1982). 
2475 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 (1929). 
25Id. at 388, 285 P. at 648. 
26Transcript vol. II, p. 376. 
9 
show on old maps, was only recently created, and had been frequently locked.27 Also, the 
evidence that an individual went to "the Blue Lakes" could mean that the person went to 
"Blue Lake" and not to either Joyce Lake or Boyer Lake. 
The holding of Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. shows that a definite path is essential: 
With respect to the certainty of the line or course of the road, the 
evidence was also sufficient to support the decree. While the 
public cannot acquire a right by use to pass over a tract of land 
generally, but only in a certain line or way, it is not 
indispensable to the acquisition of the right that there should be 
no deviation in the use from a direct line of travel. If the travel 
has remained substantially unchanged, and the practical identity 
of the road preserved, it is sufficient, although there may have 
been slight deviations from the common way to avoid 
encroachments, obstacles, or obstructions upon the road.28 
This confirms that "the public cannot acquire a right by use to pass over a tract of land 
generally." Here, there was no evidence that the "travel has remained substantially 
unchanged" or that "the practical identity of the road preserved," because there was no road 
or common way. Boyers' claim for a public road, based on passage over a tract of land 
generally and not over a definite road, must be rejected. 
II: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THE RIGHTS 
OF THE WATER COMPANY AS PART OF THE COURT'S 
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO EACH SEGMENT OF THE 
ROAD. 
The Water Users acknowledge their pleadings do not expressly claim an easement 
over the Boyer property. But, Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
Transcript vol. I, pp. 251-52. 
^Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah at 391-92, 285 P. at 649. 
10 
provides that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor 
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." 
Cases interpreting this section confirm "the rules allow examination into and settlement of 
all issues bearing upon the controversy, with latitude for proof that extends beyond the 
pleadings, where appropriate."29 "[I]t could not be made plainer that the underlying purpose 
of the rules is that judgment should be granted in accordance with the law and the evidence 
as the ends of justice require[.]"30 
Boyers do not claim that the result reached by the trial court was unfair or contrary to 
fact, only that it was not pleaded. The courts have rejected claims based on improper 
pleading where the party "did not claim that it was prejudiced"31 or show that it had 
additional evidence to present on the subject.32 
The presentations of the parties placed in issue all rights of the parties to the loop 
road. The trial court's decision shows the court made an effort to determine the rights of 
each party in each segment of the road.33 There is evidence to support the trial court's 
determination. Dennis Wright testified to traveling over the roads beginning in the early 
™Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah 
1996) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
™First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 
1979). 
31
 Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d at 1374. 
32See Hill v. Allred, 2009 UT 28, Tf 48. 
33See generally R-Haynes 1695-99. 
11 
1950s with his grandfather to inspect the reservoir.34 He further testified that as the current 
water master he travels to the reservoir many times in the springtime and at least once each 
week during the summer.35 There was no evidence that this regular use was ever interrupted. 
Boyers have not shown any prejudice or that the decision of the trial court was 
somehow factually incorrect. The evidence also shows that the Water Users had an express 
easement over the Middle Fork Road36 and condemned a way over the East Fork Road.37 
Where the pleadings and evidence put the rights along the entire loop road at issue, 
it was proper for the trial court to determine the rights of the Water Users in the loop road. 
The judgment reflecting that the Water Users have a prescriptive easement over the Boyer 
property should be affirmed. 
Ill: THERE WAS NO COMPELLING, CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE OF A PUBLIC ROAD ON THE EAST FORK. 
The Water Users adopt and incorporate herein the arguments set forth in Point IV of 
the brief on cross-appeal filed by the Haynes parties. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no clear and convincing evidence that the East Fork Road was continuously 
used by members of the public for any ten year period. Similarly, the Water Users agree with 
the position of the Haynes parties that none of the subject roads had become public and that 
34Transcript vol. IV, p. 837. 
35Id. p. 838-39. 
36Plaintiff s exh. 6. 
37Transcript vol. Ill, pp. 673-74. 
12 
any use by members of the public was permissive given the wild, unenclosed nature of the 
land at time. In the event this Court affirms the trial court's ruling that portions of the road 
are public, this Court should also affirm the trial court's ruling that the East Fork Road did 
not extend past the midpoint of Section 8 (T2N R8E), and that the Middle Fork Road did not 
extend past Section 4 (TIN R8E). The ruling that there was no public road past those point 
is supported by the maps of the period and by other evidence and should be affirmed. 
The trial court's finding that the Water Users have a prescriptive easement over the 
Boyer property was within the scope of issues tried, and was harmless in any event. It should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this X ? d a y of October, 2009. 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. Cragun 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: U 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water 
Users Corporation 
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